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Dear Editor: 
 
We find that Hicks et aliorum reply [1] to our response [2] to their original paper [3] mostly resolves 
apparent disagreements between us. We are in agreement that forensic practitioners must think 
carefully about, carefully define, and carefully communicate to the court, the propositions that they 
address. We further agree that forensic practitioners should take care to avoid the sorts of errors 
described in [3].  
It is very helpful that [1] emphasizes that [3] was intended to present a “framework for thinking”, not 
a “prescriptive” “list of default propositions”. Our response in [2] was motivated by the fear that the 
section in [1] on forensic voice comparison would be read prescriptively, and that this would lead to 
negative outcomes. 
An apparent point of disagreement outstanding is whether properties such as speaker sex, language 
spoken, and accent spoken should be treated as “evidence”, or as “information” which can be used to 
delimit the relevant population. This depends on the circumstances of the case. For example, if the 
sex of the speaker is unclear or in dispute, then the relevant population cannot be delimited to speakers 
of a particular sex. In the section from [2] quoted in [1], we were careful to state that speaker sex, 
language spoken, and accent spoken will usually be obvious, and will usually be perceptually salient 
to all parties, and will therefore usually not be disputed. In the latter circumstances, the court would 
be unlikely to consider expert testimony regarding these properties (e.g., whether the speaker is male 
of female) admissible, since it would not require “scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge” (US Federal Rule of Evidence 702), nor would it “provide the court with information 
likely to be outside the court’s own knowledge and experience” (England & Wales Criminal Practice 
Directions 19A.1). Thus, in such circumstances, it would not be advisable for a forensic practitioner 
to attempt to provide expert testimony regarding these properties, e.g., whether the speaker is male 
or female.1 Instead, we continue to argue that it would be appropriate for the forensic practitioner to 
use these properties to delimit the relevant population, and explain to the court that this is what they 
have done. And in fact Hicks et alii appear to agree with us on this. Referring to an example based 
on regional accent, they state that “whether or not the observations on the accent are contested, ... one 
can disclose this element and say that the evaluation is based on the assumption that the relevant 
population is a group of people from a given region.” It seems that Hicks et alii do not actually 
disapprove of the procedures that we describe in [2] for conducting a forensic voice comparison 
                                                 
1 Note that this is a different question from that of what strength of evidence may be associated with the fact that both the 
known- and questioned speaker are of a given sex, or speakers of a given language or accent as was our example in [2]. 
analysis. Their stated disagreement appears to be related to definitions of words, rather any real 
disagreement regarding principles. 
In [2] we explicitly stated that “We do not mean to imply that there is something special about forensic 
voice comparison which makes it different from all other branches of forensic science.” This was 
intended to prevent a misinterpretation of our remarks as implying that forensic voice comparison 
was somehow exempt from principles that are generally applicable in evaluation of strength of 
evidence across all branches of forensic science, or that only those with casework experience in 
forensic voice comparison are competent to opine on the application of those principles within this 
branch of forensic science. Unfortunately, Hicks et alii appear to have misinterpreted our remarks in 
just this way.  
The history of forensic voice comparison includes practitioners of the spectrographic approach 
arguing that only those with experience using that approach should be allowed to testify which respect 
to its validity. The approach was widely criticised by others on the grounds that its validity had not 
been empirically demonstrated under casework conditions. One does not need to have experience 
using a particular approach to be competent to argue the principle that, whatever the approach, it 
should not be used unless it has been empirically validated under conditions sufficiently similar to 
the conditions of intended use. We hereby explicitly state that it is not our opinion that only those 
with first-hand experience in a particular branch of forensic science or with a particular approach are 
competent to opine on the application of principles to that branch of forensic science or to that 
approach.  
A point that we wanted to make in [2] is, perhaps, more subtle. The principles are absolutely 
applicable, but, without sufficient understanding of the complexities of a particular branch of forensic 
science, one may inadvertently misapply the principles, leading to undesired results. In general, unless 
authors are themselves experts in a particular branch of forensic science, we would recommend that 
they collaborate or at least consult with experts in that branch of forensic science before basing 
arguments on examples drawn from that branch of forensic science. This would hopefully reduce the 
potential for misunderstanding and miscommunication, and more effectively and efficiently achieve 
shared goals. 
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Editor’s response 
While this is a good response, we’ve already had ‘their paper → your response → their response to your response’, and 
this format is the norm in these matters otherwise we could go on forever. 
